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ABSTRACT  Boko Haram, a radical Islamist group from northeastern Nigeria, has caused 
severe destruction in Nigeria since 2009. The threat posed by the extremist group has been 
described by the present Nigerian President as worse than that of Nigeria’s civil war in the 
1960s. A major drawback in the Boko Haram literature to date is that much effort has been 
spent to remedy the problem in lieu of understanding it. This paper attempts to bridge this 
important gap in existing literaure by exploring the role of religion as a force of mobilisation 
as well as an identity marker in Nigeria, and showing how the practice and perception of religion 
are implicated in the ongoing terrorism of Boko Haram. In addition, the paper draws on the 
relative deprivation theory to understand why Boko Haram rebels and to argue that religion is 
not always a sufficient reason for explaining the onset of religious terrorism.
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INTRODUCTION
Since 2009, bombings and shootings by the Nigerian extremist group Boko 
Haram have targeted Nigeria’s religious and ethnic fault lines in an apparently 
escalating bid to hurt the nation’s stability. A spate of increasingly coordinated 
and sophisticated attacks against churches from December 2011 through July 2012 
suggests a strategy of provocation through which the group seeks to spark wide-
scale sectarian violence that will strike at the foundations of the country (Forest, 
2012). The group killed more than 900 people in 2012 and about 250 people in 
2013 (Ndujihe, 2013). Human rights organisations estimate that approximately 3,500 
Nigerians have been killed in violent attacks related to Boko Haram over the past 
three years (IRIN, 22 February 2013). More recently, at least 187 persons including 
women and children were reported to have been killed by either gunshots or fire 
after Boko Haram gunmen engaged soldiers of the Joint Task Force (JTF) in a 
deadly shootout that left the commercial border town of Baga in Borno State 
completely burnt down (Premium Times, 22 April 2013; Atlanta Blackstar, 23 
April 2013). At least 2,000 houses, 64 motorcycles and 40 cars were burnt in 
the wake of the attack.
In January 2012, the present Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan stated that, 
“[t]he situation we have in our hands is even worse than the civil war that we 
fought.”(1) Former Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC) in Nigeria, Nuhu Ribadu, toed a similar line when he argued that if 
nothing was done about Boko Haram, “Nigerians will lose Nigeria to civil war” 
(Codewit World News, 25 March 2013). Unfortunately, numerous attempts at nego-
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tiating with the group, including the recent amnesty offer extended to members 
of the group, have stalled due to distrust on both sides, and the factionalized 
leadership of the group’s different cells (IRIN, 22 February 2013). In the latest 
violence, 53 people were killed and 13 villages burnt in central Nigeria’s Benue 
State (BBC News, 15 May 2013). Following these deadly attacks by Boko Haram, 
the Nigerian President has declared a state of emergency in three northern states: 
Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe. In a pre-recorded address broadcast on 14 May 2013, 
President Jonathan said: “What we are facing is not just militancy or criminality, 
but a rebellion and insurgency by terrorist groups which pose a very serious 
threat to national unity and territorial integrity” (BBC News, 15 May 2013). The 
President further noted that Boko Haram actions amount to a “declaration of 
war” (BBC News, 15 May 2013).
Although the problem of Boko Haram has elicited many studies in recent years, 
a major drawback in the literature to date is that much effort has been spent to 
remedy the problem instead of understanding it. This paper attempts to bridge this 
important gap by exploring the role of religion as a force of mobilisation as well 
as an identity marker in Nigeria, and showing how the practice and perception of 
religion are implicated in the current terrorism of Boko Haram. Specifically, the 
paper uses the theory of relative deprivation to understand why Boko Haram rebels 
and to demonstrate that religion is not always the sufficient reason for the onset of 
religious terrorism.
The rest of this paper is divided into four main parts. The first examines the 
role of religion as an identity marker in Nigeria. The second part reviews existing 
literature in order to glean an understanding of religious terrorism. The third part 
discusses the specific nature of religious terrorism and the emergence and evolution 
of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria. The fourth part considers the role of relative 
deprivation in fuelling violence in Boko Haram members and supporters.
RELIGION AS AN IDENTITY MARKER IN NIGERIA
Given Nigeria’s religious pluralism, the nation makes an interesting case study 
for exploring the role of religion as a force of mobilisation as well as an identity 
marker. The mélange of religions and ethnicities coupled with the complex web 
of politically salient identities and history of chronic and seemingly intractable 
conflicts and instability qualifies Nigeria as one of the most deeply divided nations 
in Africa (Osaghae & Suberu, 2005: 4). The religious demography in Nigeria is 
evenly split between Christians and Muslims with the latter having a slight edge in 
terms of population (Ekot, 2009). Muslims constitute 50.5% of the population while 
Christians constitute 48.2% of the total population. Other religious groups make up 
the remaining 1.3% (Okpanachi, 2009). Clearly, Islam and Christianity are the two 
dominant religions in Nigeria, and almost the entire scale of social, political and 
economic relations revolve around these two identity formations (Kukah, 1999: 99). 
Islam is the predominant religion in the north while Christianity has its stronghold 
in the south (Kukah, 1993: 6). The amalgamation of the north and the south of 
Nigeria in 1914 brought the two religions into closer contact as Muslims and 
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Christians began to participate in the affairs of the national state (Falola, 1998: 1). 
Based on the religious demography of Nigeria, it is not surprising that religion 
significantly shapes the identity of its citizens. In 2004, Nigerians were ranked 
“the most religious people in the ten nations polled, with 90% of the population 
believing in God, praying regularly, and affirming their readiness to die on behalf 
of their belief” (BBC News, 11 November 2005).
A number of studies have explored the relationship between religion and identity 
(Comstock, 1984; Blanco-Mancilla, 2003). The term, identity, has different conno-
tations. In his study on the impact of religion on identity in northern Nigeria, 
Blanco-Mancilla (2003: 1) defined identity as “an ensemble of ‘subject positions,’ 
e.g., ‘Muslim Hausa,’ ‘Christian female,’ and ‘northern Nigerian’; each representing 
the individual’s identification with a particular group, such as ethnicity, religion, 
[sic] gender.” This definition captures the way people view themselves in Nigeria 
where identity is defined by affiliation to religious and ethnic groups in lieu of the 
national state. In Nigeria, it is falsely assumed by many that a Hausa man, by 
virtue of his ethnicity, is a Muslim. Similarly, it is assumed that every Igbo person 
is a Christian. This close link between religion and ethnicity holds serious impli-
cations for religious converts in Nigeria. For instance, is a Hausa man more of 
a Muslim than an Idoma(2) man who converts to Islam?
A more embracing definition conceptualises identity as “a combination of 
socio-cultural characteristics which individuals share, or are presumed to share, 
with others on the basis of which one group may be distinguished from others” 
(Alubo, 2009: 9). In this sense, identity is not only limited to how I see myself, 
it is simultaneously a fusion of how I see myself and how I believe to be perceived 
by others. As the defining feature of people’s perception of the other, identity has 
a deep political undertone since it frequently serves as the “basis for inclusion 
and exclusion” (Harris & Williams, 2003). This construction of identity has 
repercussions for the links among identity, citizenship, and group rights in a 
deeply divided country as in Nigeria, where citizenship is tied to group rights 
and thus, inextricably connected to identity. Consequently, religious affiliation 
tends to override citizenship.(3)
Furthermore, the role of religion as a legitimizer of power has serious implications 
for a pluralist country such as Nigeria. This derives from the views of the dominant 
religious groups in the country who see God as the source and summit of power. 
This perception of power leads to the contestation for political leadership along 
religious identities. This partly explains why elections and political appointments 
are areas where the interplay between religion and politics often comes to the fore 
in Nigeria. Followers of religious groups strongly canvass for one of their kin to be 
elected into political office. In many instances, “these contestations result in violence. 
In such conflicts, holders of particular identities as defined by the attackers are 
singled out for liquidation, forced to relocate and their properties destroyed. The 
collective nature of the violence is perhaps serving to strengthen geo-political 
solidarity” (Alubo, 2009: 6). For instance, the appointment of a Christian as a 
local council chairman in Jos in September 2001 triggered violence, which led 
to the death of over 160 people (Agbiboa & Okem, forthcoming).
More recently, following the April 2011 presidential elections in Nigeria, Human 
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Rights Watch (2011) reported that over 800 people were killed, and close to 
65,000 people were displaced in three days of violent protests in 12 states in the 
north. The violence started with popular protests by supporters of the main oppo-
sition candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, a northern Muslim from the Congress for 
Progressive Change Party, following the re-election of the incumbent president, 
Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from the minority south, who was the candidate 
for the ruling People’s Democratic Party. Indeed, the Boko Haram insurgency is 
not unrelated to the fact that a Christian from the largely Christian-dominated 
south is in power. As one of their pre-conditions for peace, Boko Haram has 
called on President Jonathan to embrace Islam or resign from office (Nigerian 
Tribune, 6 August 2012).
The comingling of religion with politics in Nigeria is portentous for the stability 
of the country and the emergence of a true national identity. Unfortunately, govern-
ment complicity in religious matters has often fanned the flames of religious 
tensions. During his tenure as president (1985–1993), for example, Ibrahim Babangida 
unilaterally registered Nigeria as a full-fledged member of the Organization of 
Islamic Countries (OIC).(4) Anchored on the core values and goals of the OIC, 
membership of the organisation is underpinned by a commitment to the advancement 
of Islam (Kenny, 1996; Ekot, 2009). Toeing a similar line, President Sani Abacha, 
who succeeded the Interim National Government set up when Babangida was 
forced out of office, again unilaterally registered Nigeria as a member of the D-8 
(Developing-8), an organisation for development cooperation among major Muslim 
developing nations, including Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, 
Pakistan and Turkey.
These decisions caused much consternation and anxiety among Nigerian Christians 
who saw the government moves as an attempt toward the Islamisation of Nigeria. 
Following a chorus of disapproval by Christians, the issue of Nigerian membership 
in the OIC was put on hold. This decision, however, precipitated a series of religious 
disturbances in the north, beginning with the March 1986 clash in Ilorin between 
Muslims and Christians (Udoidem, 1997: 172) and the May 1986 clash between 
Christian and Muslim students at Uthman Dan Fodio University in Sokoto (Ekot, 
2009: 57).
The politics of religion in Nigeria is evident in the Sharia law debate, which 
has always pitted the Muslim-dominated north against the Christian-dominated 
south. The issue engulfed Nigeria shortly after her return to democracy in 1999 
(Ekot, 2009). Zamfara State was the first northern state to introduce Sharia as 
the supreme law of the land. The then Zamfara governor, Ahmed Sani, was quoted 
as saying: “Whoever administers or governs any society not based on Sharia is 
an unbeliever” (The Post Express, 15 July 2000). Following his example, many 
northern governors also soon introduced Sharia law, but in the case of Kaduna 
State with half of its population being Christians, there was a strong resistance. 
This led to violent religious confrontations in February 2000 between Christians 
and Muslims as attempts were made to implement the Sharia law. “In this con-
flict, hundreds of people were killed, property worth billions of Naira was destroyed 
and thousands of people were rendered homeless” (Ekot, 2009: 63). “From the 
onset,” wrote Ekot (2009: 54), “the Muslims had never given up their quest for 
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Nigeria to be an Islamic state …”
It is important to note that the ethnic factor has a significant role to play in 
most of the religious conflicts that have engulfed Nigeria. Specifically, Nigeria’s 
return to democracy in 1999 enabled people to vent their pent-up anger and 
express themselves more freely. As Duruji (2010: 92) aptly noted, “[democracy] 
opened up the space for expression of suppressed ethno-religious demands bottled 
up by years of repressive military rule.” In particular, the Jos crisis illustrates 
this fact. Over three thousand people were killed and more than 250 thousand 
people displaced in Plateau State in November 2008 because of the results of local 
government election that were viewed by the voters as unfavourable to some people 
in Jos North Local Government Area (Meredith, 2005: 587). According to Ostien 
(2009: 1), local conflicts in Jos arose “primarily out of ethnic differences, pitting 
Hausa ‘settlers’ against the Plateau ‘indigenes’ groups of Afizere, Anaguta and 
Berom.”(5) He further argued that the underlying problem was “the alleged rights of 
indigenes … to control particular locations.” Ojie & Ewhrudjakpor (2009: 7–8) argued: 
“the battle for supremacy between Hausa and Fulani settlers and indigenes … has 
been largely exploited by religious bigots and political jobbers.”
Such is a brief background to the combustible issue of religious identity in 
Nigeria. The next section gleans an understanding of religious terrorism from 
existing literature and shows how this understanding is implicated in the ongoing 
Boko Haram terrorism in northern Nigeria.
UNDERSTANDING RELIGIOUS TERRORISM
The link between religion and violence has a long genealogy in western scholar-
ship (Hasenclever & Rittberger, 2000; Cavanaugh, 2004). Specifically, the concept 
of “religious terrorism” goes back to David Rapoport’s (1984) paper analysing the 
use of terror in the three monotheistic religions. This influential paper inspired many 
subsequent studies on the subject, primarily in the field of terrorism studies, which 
sought to explain “why violence and religion has re-emerged so dramatically at this 
moment in history and why they have so frequently been found in combination” 
(Juergensmeyer, 2003: 121; cf. Ranstorp, 1996; Laqueur, 1999; Lesser et al., 1999; 
Hoffman, 2006). In this particular literature, “religious terrorism” has been raised 
above a simple label to a set of descriptive characteristics and substantive claims 
which appear to delineate it as a specific “type” of political violence, fundamentally 
different to previous or other forms of terrorism. As argued by Bruce Hoffman 
(2006: 88, 272), this new type of terrorism produces “radically different value 
systems, mechanisms of legitimation and justification, concepts of morality and, 
worldview”; [consequently, religious terrorism] “represents a very different and pos-
sibly far more lethal threat than that posed by more familiar, traditional terrorist 
adversaries.”
The claim about the specific nature of religious terrorism rests on a number 
of arguments, three of which are discussed here. The first of the three arguments 
is that religious terrorists have anti-modern goals of returning society to an 
idealised version of the past and are therefore necessarily anti-democratic and 
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anti-progressive. Audrey Cronin (2003: 38), for example, argued that “the forces 
of history seem to be driving international terrorism back to a much earlier 
time, with echoes of the behaviour of ‘sacred’ terrorists … clearly apparent in 
the terrorist organisation such as al-Qaeda.” For his part, Juergensmeyer (2003: 
230) contended that religious terrorists worked to “an anti-modern political 
agenda.” In his words:
They have come to hate secular governments with an almost transcendent 
passion … dreamed of revolutionary changes that would establish a godly 
social order in the rubble of what the citizens of most secular societies 
have regarded as modern, egalitarian democracies.… The logic of this kind 
of militant religiosity has therefore been difficult for many people to com-
prehend. Yet its challenge has been profound, for it has contained a funda-
mental critique of the world’s post-Enlightenment secular culture and politics. 
(Juergensmeyer, 2003: 232)
This argument is further expanded to propose, that religious terrorists have 
objectives that are absolutist, inflexible, unrealistic, devoid of political pragmatism 
and hostile to negotiation (Gunning & Jackson, 2011). As Matthew Morgan (2004: 
30–31) noted: “Today’s terrorists don’t want a seat at the table, they want to 
destroy the table and everyone sitting at it.” Daniel Byman (2003: 147) wrote of 
Al-Qaeda: “Because of the scope of its grievances, its broader agenda of rectifying 
humiliation, and a poisoned worldview that glorifies jihad as a solution, appeasing 
al-Qaeda is difficult in theory and impossible in practice.”
The second important argument on the nature of religious terrorism suggests 
that religious terrorists employ a different kind of violence to the previous ter-
rorists. For example, it is argued that for the “religious terrorist, violence is … a 
sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct response to some theological 
demand” (Hoffman, 2006: 88), as opposed to a tactical means to a political 
end. Furthermore, it is suggested that, because religious terrorists have transcen-
dental aims, are engaged in a cosmic war and lack an earthly constituency, they 
are not constrained in their pedagogy of violence and take an apocalyptic view 
of violent confrontation: “What makes religious violence particularly savage and 
relentless is that its perpetrators have placed such religious images of divine 
struggle—cosmic war—in the service of worldly political battles” (Juergensmeyer, 
2003: 149–150). For this reason, acts of religious terror serve not only as tac-
tics in a political struggle, but also as evocations of a much larger spiritual 
confrontation. Thus, religious terrorists aim for maximum causalities and are 
willing to use weapons of mass destruction (Gunning & Jackson, 2011). As 
Magnus Ranstorp (1996: 54) observed, they are “relatively unconstrained in the 
lethality and the indiscriminate nature of violence used,” because they lack “any 
moral constraints in the use of violence” (cf. Hoffman, 2006: 88). Similarly, 
Jessica Stern (2003: xxii) argued: “Religious terrorists groups are more violent 
than their secular counterparts and are probably more likely to use weapons of 
mass destruction.”
Thirdly, it has been argued that religious terrorists have the capacity to evoke 
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total commitment and fanaticism from their members, and are characterised by 
the suspension of doubt—in contrast to the supposedly more measured attitudes 
of secular groups (Gunning & Jackson, 2011). Juergensmeyer (2003: 220) pointed 
out that “these disturbing displays have been accompanied by strong claims of 
moral justification and an enduring absolutism, characterised by the intensity of 
the religious activists’ commitment.” Moreover, he suggested that, in some cases, 
the certainties of the religious viewpoint and the promises of the next world were 
the primary motivating factors in driving insecure, alienated and marginalised 
youths to join religious terrorist groups as a means of psychological empowerment. 
As Juergensmeyer (2003: 187) argued, “[t]he idea of cosmic war is compelling 
to religious activists because it ennobles and exalts those who consider themselves 
a part of it … it provides escape from humiliation and impossible predicaments.… 
They become involved in terrorism … to provide themselves with a sense of power.” 
It has been further argued that such impressionable, alienated and disempowered 
young people are vulnerable to forms of brainwashing and undue influence by the 
recruiters, extremist preachers or material available on the internet (Hoffman, 2006: 
197–228, 288–290).
THE TERRORISM OF BOKO HARAM
Radical Islam is not a new phenomenon in northern Nigeria. Following inde-
pendence in October 1960, the rise of the radical Maitatsine movement in the 
1970s led to clashes with the Nigerian Police Force in Kano in December 1980, 
and in Maiduguri in October 1982, leaving many hundreds dead (Agbiboa, 2013). 
Alhaji Muhammadu Marwa, known as the Maitatsine (“One who curses”), cham-
pioned these intra-religious riots (Ekot, 2009: 56). The uprisings had its roots in 
the “deeply conservative practice of Islam,” dominant in the region that had its 
origins in the highly successful jihad (holy war) of Sheik Usman dan Fodio of 
Sokoto (1754–1817) in the first decade of the nineteenth century (Hickey, 1984: 
251). What began as a search for religious purification soon became a search for 
a political kingdom (Crowder, 1978: 71), with the outcome that “Islam has 
remained the focal veneer for the legitimacy of the northern ruling class, and 
consequently, its politicians have always prided themselves as soldiers for the 
defence of the faith” (Udoidem, 1997: 156; Ekot, 2009: 52).
Since 2009, however, Boko Haram, yet another religious terrorist group from 
north eastern Nigeria, has been responsible for more violence than any other 
armed group in Nigeria (Forest, 2012). The nomenclature, “Boko Haram,” is 
derived from a combination of the Hausa word, boko (book), and the Arabic 
word, haram (forbidden). Put together, Boko Haram means “Western education 
is forbidden,” as it is important here to clarify that the Hausa word, “boko,” 
originally had implications of “falseness” and “duplicity.” This certainly has 
increasingly become the case in recent times, but only with regard to books of 
Western provenance, as they were deemed to contain material antithetical to Islam 
and, therefore, “boko.” In any case, Boko Haram has even rejected the designation, 
“Western education is forbidden,” and instead, the group now prefers the slogan, 
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“Western culture is forbidden.” The difference, as one of the senior members of Boko 
Haram noted, is that “while the first gives the impression that we are opposed to 
formal education coming from the West … which is not true, the second affirms our 
belief in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not education), for culture is broader, it 
includes education but not determined by Western education” (Onuoha, 2012: 1–2).
Boko Haram officially calls itself Jama’atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda’wati wal Jihad 
(People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad). 
Across northern Nigeria, Western education continues to be linked to attempts by 
evangelical Christians to convert Muslims who fear the southern economic and 
political domination. As Isa (2010: 322) contended, the term, Boko Haram, implied 
a sense of rejection and “resistance to imposition of Western education and its 
system of colonial social organisation, which replaced and degraded the earlier 
Islamic order of the jihadist state.” Isa (2010: 332) further argued that:
Islamic scholars and clerics who once held sway in the caliphate state and 
courts assigned the name boko to northern elites who spoke, acted, ruled and 
operated the state like their Western colonial masters. It is not uncommon 
to hear in discussions among Islamist scholars and average northerners that 
poverty and collapsed governance—the bane of the region—can be blamed 
on the failures and corrupt attitudes of yan boko (modern elites trained at 
secular schools) who have acquired a Western education and are currently 
in positions of power. As such, the system represented by the yan boko is 
unjust, secular and has no divine origin. It is therefore un-Islamic, which in 
turn accounts for its ineptitude and corruptness.
Boko Haram was led by Mohammed Yusuf until he was killed by Nigerian 
security forces just after the sectarian violence in July 2009 which left over 1,000 
people dead (Umar, 2011; Uzodike & Maiangwa, 2012). Yusuf, born on the 29th 
of January, 1970, in Girgir village in Yobe State, Nigeria, received instruction in 
Salafi radicalism and was a protégé of Ibn Taymiyyah, an Islamic scholar (alim) 
born in Harran, Turkey (Chothia, 2011). At the time of his death, Yusuf was the 
commander in chief (Amir ul-Aam) of the entire group. He had two deputies 
(Na’ib Amir ul-Aam I & II ). With regards to state organisation, each state and 
local government where Boko Haram existed had its own amir (commander/
leader).
Boko Haram’s membership comprises university lecturers, bankers, political 
elites, drug addicts, unemployed graduates, almajiris,(6) and migrants from neigh-
bouring countries (Agbiboa, 2013). Members are also drawn primarily from the 
Kanuri tribe with roughly 4% of the Nigerian population, who are concentrated in 
the north eastern states of Nigeria including Bauchi and Borno, and the Hausa-Fulani 
with 29% of the population, spread more generally throughout most of the northern 
states (Forest, 2012). Boko Haram members distinguish themselves by growing long 
beards and wearing red or black headscarves. As was with the Maitatsine move-
ment, many of the members attracted by Boko Haram are animated by deep-seated 
socioeconomic and political grievances such as poor governance and elite corrup-
tion. Already, John Campbell noted, “Boko Haram, once an obscure, radical 
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Islamic cult in the North, is evolving into an insurrection with support among 
the impoverished and alienated Northern population” (The Atlantic, 24 June 2011).
Boko Haram’s ideology is embedded in deeply traditional Islamism, and is but 
one of several variants of radical Islamism to have emerged in northern Nigeria. 
Its adherents are reportedly influenced by the Koranic phrase: “Anyone who is 
not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors” (cited in 
Thurston, 2011). As the name suggests, Boko Haram is strongly opposed to what 
it sees as a Western-based incursion that threatens traditional values, beliefs, and 
customs among Muslim communities in northern Nigeria. The group’s first leader, 
Mohammed Yusuf, told the BBC in 2009: “Western-style education is mixed with 
issues that run contrary to our beliefs in Islam” (BBC News, 31 July 2009). Else-
where, the charismatic leader argued: “Our land was an Islamic state before the 
colonial masters turned it to a kafir (infidel) land. The current system is contrary 
to true Islamic beliefs” (Daily Trust, 27 July 2009). In an audiotape posted on 
the internet in January 2012, a spokesman for the group, Abubakar Shekau, even 
accused the U.S. of waging war on Islam (Agbiboa, 2013: 19).
I. The Birth of a Full Insurgency
Boko Haram became a full-fledged insurgency following confrontations between 
the group and the state’s security agency in Bauchi State charged with the respon-
sibility of enforcing a newly introduced law that required motorcyclists in the 
entire country to wear crash-helmets. Members of Boko Haram refused to obey 
this law. This led to a violent confrontation between the state’s enforcement 
agency and Boko Haram, killing 17 Boko Haram members in the crossfire (United 
States Institute of Peace, 2012: 12). The group’s hideout in Bauchi State was 
also ransacked, and materials for making explosives were confiscated. Following 
this crackdown, the group mobilized its members for reprisal attacks which led 
to the death of several policemen and civilians. The riot was temporarily quelled 
after Nigerian forces captured and killed the Boko Haram leader, Mohammed 
Yusuf. Following the death of Yusuf, and the arrest of several of Boko Haram 
members, the group retreated. But it was only pro tem, for the group resurfaced 
with more advanced tactics and devastating attacks, as was demonstrated in the 
bombing of the police headquarters in Abuja in June 2011 and the United Nations 
Headquarters in August 2011 (Reuters, 29 August 2011).
For many Boko Haram members, the extrajudicial killing of their founder 
served to foment pre-existing animosities toward the Nigerian government and 
its security forces. In the group’s bid to avenge the death of their founder, almost 
every other person and group outside Boko Haram was antagonised, especially 
the Nigerian security forces. Boko Haram’s most frequent targets have been police 
stations, patrols, and individual policemen at home or in public who were off-duty 
or even retired. They have used petrol bombs, improvised explosive devices, and 
armed assaults in these violent attacks (Forest, 2012; Agbiboa, 2013). Among the 
demands of the group are the release of all its prisoners and the prosecution of 
those responsible for the killing of their founder (Rogers, 2012). Such demands 
severely pitted the group against the Nigerian state and its security forces.
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While the overriding goal of Boko Haram is to wrest control from the Nigerian 
state and to impose Sharia across the country, the cocktail of political corruption, 
chronic poverty, and youth unemployment in northern Nigeria continues to fuel 
members and supporters of Boko Haram (Mustapha, 2012). According to Isa (2010: 
329), Boko Haram communities had been wrecked by “poverty, deteriorating social 
services and infrastructure, educational backwardness, rising numbers of unemployed 
graduates, massive numbers of unemployed youths, dwindling fortunes in agricul-
ture … and the weak and dwindling productive base of the northern economy.” 
According to Kukah (2012), Boko Haram is symptomatic of what happens when 
“the architecture of state are weighed down and destroyed by corruption.” It has 
been argued that people living under poor socio-economic conditions may draw 
guidance from their religious identity, particularly because religious activists are 
commonly accessible at the most grass-roots levels (EWER, 2009).
II. Source(s) of Funding
In the past, Nigerian officials have been criticized for being unable to trace 
much of the funding that the group has received. However, in February 2012, 
recently arrested Boko Haram officials revealed that while the organisation ini-
tially relied on donations from members, its links with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM) opened it up to more funding from groups in Saudi Arabia and 
the UK (Agbiboa, 2013). Furthermore, the arrested officials divulged that other 
sources of funding included the Al Muntada Trust Fund and the Islamic World 
Society. Also, a spokesman of Boko Haram revealed that Kano State Governor 
Ibrahim Shekarau and Bauchi State Governor Isa Yuguda had been paying them 
monthly (Aziken et al., 2012).
Boko Haram also derives its finances from robbing local banks. For example, 
on 12 January 2010, four Boko Haram members attempted to rob a bank in 
Bakori Local Government Area of Katsina State, according to the local Police 
Commissioner Umaru Abubakar (Leigh, 2011). On 4 December 2011, Bauchi 
Police Commissioner Ikechukwu Aduba claimed that members of Boko Haram 
had robbed local branches of Guaranty Trust Bank PLC and Intercontinental Bank 
PLC (Ibrahim, 2011). And on 10 December 2011, Mohammed Abdullahi, Central 
Bank of Nigeria spokesman claimed that “At least 30 bank attacks attributed to 
Boko Haram have been reported this year” (Onu & Muhammad, 2011). Beyond 
bank robberies and individual financiers, there have also been rumours of Boko 
Haram’s involvement in trafficking illicit weapons, albeit there has been no hard 
evidence to confirm such claims.
Given their large-scale attacks that have spread serious ripples beyond the 
shores of Nigeria, there is no doubt that Boko Haram’s activities have generated 
a psychological impact that transcends the actual physical damage caused. In 
particular, using suicide bombers and explosives has intensified the ferocity of 
the sect and led to speculation in some quarters that the group might be linked 
to Al-Qaeda (Uzodike & Maiangwa, 2012). Indeed, on 24 November a spokes-
man for Boko Haram, Abul Qaqa, stated: “It is true that we have links with 
Al-Qaeda. They assist us and we assist them” (Chothia, 2011). Boko Haram has 
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also admitted to establishing links in Somalia (Zimmerman, 2011). A statement 
allegedly released by the group read: “very soon, we will wage jihad.… We want 
to make it known that our jihadists have arrived in Nigeria from Somalia where 
they received real training on warfare from our brethren who made that country 
ungovernable.… This time round, our attacks will be fiercer and wider than they 
have been” (The Weekly Standard, 18 June 2011). The need for a detailed study 
of the external dimensions of Boko Haram has become all the more important 
because of the recent alleged link between the group and the developments in 
Mali and the entire Sahel region.
It is instructive to note that Boko Haram is not a monolithic entity with a 
unified purpose. There are separate factions within the movement who disagree 
about tactics and strategic directions, competing at times for attention and followers 
(Agbiboa, 2013). A recent US House of Representatives report suggested that one 
faction of the group might be focused on domestic issues and another on violent 
international extremism. Another report indicated that the group may have even 
split into three factions: one that remains moderate and welcomes an end to the 
violence; another that wants a peace agreement; and a third that refuses to negoti-
ate and wants to implement strict Sharia law across Nigeria (Forest, 2012). In July 
2011, a group calling itself the Yusufiyya Islamic Movement distributed leaflets 
widely in Maiduguri denouncing other Boko Haram factions as “evil” (Agbiboa & 
Okem, forthcoming). Asserting the legacy of founder Mohammed Yusuf, the authors 
of the leaflets distanced themselves from attacks on civilians and on churches. Today, 
“some local observers now discriminate between a Kogi Boko Haram, Kanuri Boko 
Haram, and Hausa Fulani Boko Haram” (Forest, 2012: 121).
WHY BOKO HARAM REBELS: RELATIVE DEPRIVATION IN NORTHERN NIGERIA
In his insightful article entitled “Ours is the Way of God,” Jeffrey Seul (1999: 
553) powerfully argued that religious conflicts are not always caused by religion. 
They are called religious conflicts because religion is the unifying and mobilis-
ing identity. In his words: “Religion is not the cause of religious conflict; rather 
for many … it frequently supplies the fault line along which intergroup identity 
and resource competition occurs” (Seul, 1999: 558). This telling passage provides 
an entry into understanding the religious terrorism of Boko Haram as partly a 
consequence of much larger state problems in Nigeria.
The relative deprivation theory provides a useful insight into why Boko Haram 
rebels. The implications of relative deprivation can be gleaned from the works 
of its finest exponents. In his oft-cited book “Why Men Rebel,” Gurr (1970) 
argued that people would become dissatisfied if they felt they have less than they 
should and could have. Overtime, such dissatisfaction leads to frustration and then 
rebellion against the (real or perceived) source of their deprivation. Elsewhere, 
Gurr (2005: 20) argued that structural poverty and inequality within countries are 
“breeding grounds for violent political movements in general and terrorism spe-
cifically.” Drawing on his studies of relative deprivation and conflict in Northern 
Ireland, Birrel (1972: 317) contended that group tensions developed from a dis-
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crepancy between the “ought” and the “is” of collective value satisfaction. In his 
article, titled “Towards a Theory of Revolution,” Davies (1962: 5) argued that 
the occasion of political violence was due to the insurmountable gap between 
what people wanted and what they could get; the difference between expectations 
and gratifications: “this discrepancy is a frustrating experience that is sufficiently 
intense and focused to result in either rebellion or revolution.” A key point in all 
these studies is that violent actions flourish within a context of grievances caused 
by relative deprivation.
It is no coincidence that one of the worst forms of political violence in Nigeria 
today originates in the most socio-economically deprived parts of the country. In 
the north where unemployment and chronic poverty are rife, radical Islamists groups 
have challenged the authority of the state. In the southeast, specifically in the Niger 
Delta where Nigeria’s oil resource is located, environmental degradation caused by 
irresponsible oil practices has compromised the major source of livelihood of indig-
enous people. Angered by their poor conditions amidst plenty, a flurry of ethnic 
militia groups often consisting of unemployed youths have engaged in kidnappings, 
oil pipeline vandalisations, extortion, car bombings, and other forms of violent 
attacks against the Nigerian state and its oil industry (Omeje, 2004).
The focus of this paper is, however, on northern Nigeria where the effect of 
poverty on health and education is particularly critical. In Borno State, the 
birthplace of Boko Haram, “Only 2% of children under 25 months have been 
vaccinated; 83% of young people are illiterate; 48.5% of children do not go 
to school” (Rogers, 2012: 3). Another recent report by the National Population 
Commission (2009: 118–120) found that literacy rates were much lower among 
states in the north, and that 72% of children around the ages of 6–16 had never 
attended schools in Borno State, where Boko Haram was founded (Forest, 2012). 
Also, the National Bureau of Statistics data on poverty in Nigeria shows that 
looking into each specific zone, the highest poverty rate of 64.8% is recorded 
in the North-East zone, followed by 61.2% in the North-West (NBS, 2010). On 
the other hand, the lowest poverty rate of 31.2% is recorded in the South-East, 
followed by 40.2% in the South-West.
Notably, the Human Development Index (HDI) for Nigeria as a whole has 
risen steadily from 0.425 in 1990 to 0.513 in 2008. Looking at the figures by 
zone for 2008/2009, as shown in Table 1, the highest HDI is found in the 
South-South zone (0.573) while the lowest is in the North-East zone (0.332) 
where Boko Haram operates. As for the poverty index in Nigeria, the poorest 
five states are all situated in the northern areas (UNDP, 2009). The southern states 
with a somewhat higher-level economy have high HDI, and the northern states 
with a lower-level economy have low HDI (UNDP, 2009). In addition, the trends 
in the two types of poverty presented in Table 2 shows that while a significant 
decrease in the core poor population and a decrease in the moderately poor 
population to some extent are observed in every southern zone,(7) the core poor 
increased in the north central zone, and the moderately poor increased in every 
northern zone (NBS, 2010).
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From the above, it is clear that the reality of relative deprivation in northern 
Nigeria is deep-rooted, demanding more attention than is currently the case. This 
situation is further compounded by the fact that “the wealthy elite throughout the 
country tend to be Christian, while the most impoverished communities in the 
country are found among the Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri, and other northern groups—
all of them primarily Muslim” (Forest, 2012: 56). Thus, Thurston (2011) argued 
that, “Boko Haram has an entrenched sense of victimhood and now sees the state 
as both the main persecutor of ‘true’ Muslims and the major obstacle to ‘true’ 
Islamic reform.” The emergence of violent extremists as seen in the groups 
including the Nigerian Taliban and Boko Haram can therefore be viewed as 
partly a response in northern communities to insecurities about their spiritual and 
socioeconomic future (Forest, 2012). According to Sope Elegbe, Research Director 
of the Nigerian Economic Summit Group (NESG):
The increasing poverty in Nigeria is accompanied by increasing unemploy-
ment. Unemployment is higher in the north than in the south. Mix this 
situation with radical Islam, which promises a better life for martyrs, and 
you can understand the growing violence in the north. Government statistics 
Table 1. Human development index by zone in 2008
South South South East South West North Central North East North West
HDI
[Nigeran National 
HDI: 0.513]
0.573 0.471 0.523 0.490 0.332 0.420
Source: UNDP (2009: 10).
Table 2. Trends in poverty rates by zone for two relative poverty lines (%)
Zone*
Core poor Moderately poor
1996 2004 1996 2004 
South South 23.4 17.0 34.8 18.1 
South East 18.2   7.8 35.3 19.0 
South West 27.5 18.9 33.4 24.2 
North Central 28.0 29.8 36.7 37.2 
North East 34.4 27.9 35.7 44.3 
North West 37.3 26.8 39.9 44.4 
Source: Nigeria, National Bureau of Statistics (2010).
*South South: Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa-Ibom, Cross River, Edo, Delta.
 South East: Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, Adamawa and Imo.
 South West: Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo.
 North Central: Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau and Abuja.
 North East: Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe.
 North West: Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara.
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show that the northern states have the highest proportion of uneducated 
persons. If you link a lack of education and attendant lack of opportunities to 
a high male youth population, you can imagine that some areas are actually 
a breeding ground for terrorism.      
(cited in Rogers, 2012: 4)
Given the increased frequency of bomb attacks carried out by Boko Haram, the 
prospect for human security remains grim in Nigeria, with potentially grave 
consequences for the international community. For one thing, Boko Haram provides 
Al-Qaeda with an avenue to expand its operations in Africa, should the two groups 
become affiliated organisations. Leaders of both organisations have publicly pledged 
mutual support (Agbiboa, 2013). Abubakar bin Muhammad Shekau, current head 
of Boko Haram, has linked the jihad being fought by Boko Haram with the global 
jihad. He has threatened attacks not only in Nigeria but also against “outposts of 
Western culture” (Radin, 2012).
In association with Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram could potentially pose a threat not only 
to Nigeria, but also transnationally, since Nigeria is Africa’s largest oil producer. 
Boko Haram’s increasing sophistication of attacks and its adoption of suicide car 
bombings may be a sign that the group is indeed receiving tactical and operational 
assistance from a foreign militant group. Since AQIM has attacked UN targets 
in Algeria, and Al-Shabaab has attacked UN targets in Somalia, Boko Haram’s 
decision to attack the UN building in Abuja is unlikely to be a coincidence. 
According to Forest (2012: 81), “this attack on a distinctly non-Nigerian target 
was a first for Boko Haram, and may indicate a major shift in its ideology and 
strategic goals.” Recently, the US State Department added Boko Haram’s most 
visible leader, Abubakar Shekau, to the list of specially designated global terrorists. 
Khalid al Barnawi and Abubakar Adam Kamba were also included in the list, because 
of their ties to Boko Haram and close links with AQIM (US Department of State, 
2012). However, it remains to be seen whether the attack on the UN building was 
an isolated event or whether Boko Haram has indeed embraced the tactics of global 
jihadists, targeting strategy and ideological imperatives.
CONCLUSION
The Nigerian government has over the last few months indicated its disposition 
to resolving the Boko Haram insurgency through what may be described as a 
carrot and stick approach. The former involves political dialogue with all stake-
holders. In this regard, the Nigerian state established a committee of inquiry led 
by Ambassador Usman Galtimari to “identify the grievances of the sect and make 
possible recommendations on how to improve security in the northeast region” 
(Onuoha, 2012). This carrot approach also included programs by the government 
to address deep-seated problems in northern Nigeria such as poverty, unemploy-
ment, social injustice and public corruption—conditions that continue to galvanize 
extremist tendencies among northerners. More recently, President Jonathan offered 
to grant amnesty to Boko Haram members. However, Abubakar Shekau, the leader 
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of Boko Haram, responded to the president’s amnesty entreaties by saying that 
his group had done no wrong, and that an amnesty would not be applicable to 
them. According to Shekau, it was the Nigerian government committing atrocities 
against Muslims. In his words: “Surprisingly, the Nigerian government is talking 
about granting us amnesty. What wrong have we done? On the contrary, it is we 
that should grant you [a] pardon” (Atlanta Blackstar, 23 April 2013).
Despite the above attempts by the Nigerian government to negotiate in a non-
violent way with the northern extremist group, the stick response to the Boko Haram 
uprising has received greater attention, involving the use of state security forces to 
“mount aggressive pursuit and crackdown of [Boko Haram] members” (Onuoha, 
2012: 5). To this end, the Nigerian government established a special Joint Task 
Force (JTF), known as “Operation Restore Order (JTORO)” to eliminate the threat 
posed by Boko Haram. The JTF has had modest successes, including the September 
2011 arrest of a top Boko Haram commander, Ali Saleh, and five accomplices in 
Maiduguri (Roggio, 2012). However, JTF have been accused of killing innocent 
people in the name of counter-terrorism. In Borno State, for example, JTF resorted 
to extralegal killings, dragnet arrests and intimidation of the hapless Borno residents. 
As noted by Solomon (2012: 9), “Far from conducting intelligence-driven operations, 
the JTF simply cordoned off areas and carried out house-to-house searches, at times 
shooting young men in these homes.” In the most recent crossfire between JTF and 
Boko Haram in Baga, a village on Lake Chad near Nigeria’s border with Cameroon, 
reportedly up to 187 people were killed and 77 others were injured. But Baga 
residents have accused the JTF, not Boko Haram, of firing indiscriminately at 
civilians and setting fire on much of the fishing town (Atlanta Blackstar, 23 April 
2013). These excesses can only bring about further alienation of citizens towards 
the national state and its security forces. According to Keller (1983: 274), “an 
overreliance on intimidatory techniques not only presents the image of a state 
which is low in legitimacy and desperately struggling to survive, but also in the 
long run can do more to threaten state coherence than to aid it.”
The frequent “might-is-right” approach to conflict resolution in Nigeria is not 
surprising, if we recall the words of Claude Ake (1992: 16): “more often than 
not, the post-colonial state in Nigeria presented itself as an apparatus of violence, 
and while its base in social forces remained extremely narrow it relied unduly 
on coercion for compliance, rather than authority.” While the arrest of major Boko 
Haram leaders and strategists has the potential to significantly degrade its opera-
tional capability to mount attacks, it has not yet resulted in the destruction of the 
group’s capabilities. Moreover, it must be considered that the current stick approach 
by the Nigerian government may force ultra-radical elements within Boko Haram 
to establish terrorist networks with AQIM, Al Shabaab and Al-Qaeda as a form 
of survival strategy. In the event of this happening, the sect’s operational base 
could expand beyond northern Nigeria and their target selection could change 
fundamentally to include attacks on Western interests (Onuoha, 2012).
If the Nigerian government is to douse religious tensions and extremist groups 
in the country, it must invest in inter-religious dialogues between leaders and 
followers of the two dominant religions in the country—Islam and Christianity. 
Furthermore, Christian and Muslim religious education should be tailored in such 
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a way as to promote mutual respect and amity. In addition, there is an urgent need 
for Christian and Muslim leaders in Nigeria to join together to denounce all forms 
of religious intolerance and sectarian violence. More importantly, addressing the 
current Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria must include a serious remedy for the 
deep socio-economic deprivation and sustained grievances felt by many in the north 
where Boko Haram originated. A swelling population amid economic despair not 
only creates an environment in which radical extremist ideologies can thrive but 
also legitimises their actions.
NOTES
(1) The President was referring to the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970), which killed over 1 
million people. See “Boko Haram ‘Worse than 1960s Civil War,’” http://www.afri-
canoutlookonline.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3619%3Abo
ko-haram-worse-than-1960s-civil-war-nigerian-president&Itemid=675 (Accessed April 
20, 2013).
(2) An ethno-linguistic group that lives primarily in the lower and western areas of Benue 
State, Nigeria.
(3) This idea is well captured by one of the respondents of Blanco-Mancilla (2003) who 
stated that, “I consider a Malian or Chadian who speaks Hausa and is a Muslim more a 
citizen of Sabon-Gari than an Ibo or Yoruba who is not a Muslim.”
(4) The registration of Nigeria as a member of the OIC created a fissure between Muslims 
and Christians. While Muslims welcomed the move, the Christians were vehemently 
opposed to OIC membership. Despite the tension, Nigeria is still registered as a member 
of the OIC.
(5) Officials in Nigeria tend to use the slippery term “indigene” to limit access to public 
resources, such as land, schools, and government jobs. In effect, the population of every 
state and Local Government Area (LGA) in Nigeria is divided into indigenes (defined as 
earliest extant occupiers or the recognised original inhabitants) and settlers (people who 
cannot trace their roots back to earliest times). Settlers can still be Nigerian citizens, and 
thus are not completely stateless. But discrimination against them can provoke serious 
violence.
(6) This term describes children sent by their parents to Islamic boarding schools in northern 
Nigeria, where they receive little education beyond rote memorisation of the Koran. 
Etymologically, the term Almajiri is an Arabic word for someone who leaves his home 
in search of knowledge in Islamic religion under the tutelage of an Islamic scholar 
(Agbiboa, 2013: 26).
(7) The core poor line in 2004 was calculated as 11,867 Naira (200USD). Persons whose 
expenditures fall between 11,867 and 23,733 Naira are considered to be the “moderate 
poor.” The proportion of the “core poor” increased from 6.2% in 1980 to 29.3% in 1996, 
then decreased to 22.0% in 2004 (NBS, 2010).
81No Retreat, No Surrender: Understanding the Religious Terrorism of Boko Haram
REFERENCES
Agbiboa, D.E. 2013. The Nigerian burden: Religious identity, conflict and the current terrorism 
of Boko Haram. Conflict, Security and Development, 13(1): 1–29.
Agbiboa, D.E. & E. Okem Forthcoming. Ethnicity, religion and the elusive quest for national 
identity in Nigeria. Peace Research: Canadian Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies.
Ake, C. 1992. What Is the Problem of Ethnicity in Africa? Keynote address presented at the 
Conference on Ethnicity, Society and Conflict in Natal, 14–16 September 1992. Pieter-
maritzburg Campus, University of Natal. South Africa.
Alubo, O. 2009. Citizenship and identity politics in Nigeria. In Conference Proceedings: Citi-
zenship and Identity Politics in Nigeria, March 2009. Cleen Foundation, Lagos, Nigeria. 
Online. http://www.cleen.org/Citizenship%20and%20Identity%20Crisis%20in%20Nigeria.
pdf (Accessed May 21, 2013).
Aziken, E., A. Muhammad, V. Ojeme & N. Marama 2012. We’re On Northern Govs’ Payroll—
Boko Haram. Vanguard. January 24. Online. http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/01/we-
re-on-northern-govspayroll-boko-haram/ (Accessed September 20, 2012).
Birrel, D. 1972. Relative deprivation as a factor in conflict in Northern Ireland. Sociological 
Review, 20: 317–343.
Blanco-Mancilla, G. 2003. Citizenship and Religion in Nigeria: Comparative Perspectives of 
Islam and Christianity in Kaduna State. University of Sussex, Institute of Development 
Studies.
Byman, D. 2003. Al-Qaeda as an adversary: Do we understand our enemy? World Politics, 
56(1): 139–163.
Cavanaugh, W. 2004. The Violence of “Religion”: Examining a Prevalent Myth. Working Pa-
pers no. 310. Kellogg Institute, Notre Dame, IN.
Chothia, F. 2011. Who are Nigeria’s Boko Haram? BBC News. August 26. Online. http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501 (Accessed May 13, 2012).
Comstock, R. 1984. Toward open definitions of religion. Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion, 52(3): 499–517.
Cronin, A. 2003. Behind the curve: Globalisation and international terrorism. International 
Security, 27(3): 30–58.
Crowder, M. 1978. The Story of Nigeria. Faber and Faber, London.
Davies, J. 1962. Towards a theory of revolution. American Sociological Review, 27(1): 5–19.
Duruji, M.M. 2010. Democracy and the challenge of ethno-nationalism in Nigeria’s Fourth 
Republic: Interrogating institutional mechanics. Journal of Peace, Conflict and Develop-
ment, 15(3): 92–106.
Ekot, B. 2009. Conflict, religion and ethnicity in the postcolonial Nigerian state. Australian 
Review of African Studies, 30(2): 47–67.
EWER 2009. Religious Identity and Conflict in Timor-Leste. An Early Warning and Early 
Response Program Policy Brief. Online. http://www.cicr-columbia.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2011/06/Policy-Brief-2-Religion.pdf (Accessed September 28, 2012).
Falola, T. 1998. Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies. 
University of Rochester Press, New York.
Forest, J.J.F. 2012. Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Joint Special Operations 
University (JSOU). The JSOU Press, Florida.
Gunning, J. & R. Jackson 2011. What’s so “religious” about “religious terrorism”? Critical 
Studies on Terrorism, 4(3): 369–388.
Gurr, T.R. 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
82 D.E. AGBIBOA
— 2005. Economic Factors That Contribute to Terrorism in Social and Political Con-
text. Working Group Report, International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security. 
March 8–11. Online. http://www.iris-bg.org/WorkingGroup3FinalDraftMarch8.doc 
(Accessed April 16, 2012).
Harris, P. & V. Williams 2003. Social inclusion, national identity and the moral imagination. 
The Drawing Board: An Australian Review of Public Affairs, 3(3): 205–222.
Hasenclever, A. & V. Rittberger 2000. Does religion make a difference? Theoretical approaches 
to the impact of faith on political conflict. Millennium, 29(3): 641–674.
Hickey, R. 1984. The 1982 Maitatsine Uprisings in Nigeria: A note. African Affairs, 83(331): 
251–256.
Hoffman, B. 2006. Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press, New York.
Ibrahim, L. 2011. Nigeria: Bank robbery suspects Boko Haram members. Daily Trust, February 4.
Isa, M.K. 2010. Militant islamist groups in northern Nigeria. In (W. Okumu & A. Ikelegbe, 
eds.) Militias, Rebels and Islamist Militants: Human Security and State Crises in Africa, 
pp. 313–340. Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria.
Juergensmeyer, M. 2003. Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence. 
University of California Press, Berkeley.
Keller, E.J. 1983. The state, public policy and the mediation of ethnic conflict. In (D. Rotchild 
& K.V. Olorunshola, eds.) State versus Ethnic Claims: Africa Policy Dilemmas, pp. 248–274. 
Westview Press, Boulder, Co.
Kenny, J. 1996. Sharia and Christianity in Nigeria: Islam and a secular state. Journal of 
Religion in Africa, 26: 339–364.
Kukah, M.H. 1993. Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria. Spectrum Books, Ibadan.
— 1999. Democracy and Civil Society in Nigeria. Spectrum Books, Ibadan.
 2012. Nigeria: Country as an emerging democracy: The dilemma and the promise. 
Daily Trust (Abuja). 9 September. Online. http://allafrica.com/stories/201209090189.
html?viewall=1. (Accessed April 23, 2013).
Laqueur, W. 1999. The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction. Oxford 
University Press, New York.
Leigh, K. 2011. Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Al Qaeda’s New Friend in Africa? Time, August 31. 
Online. http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0.8599,2091137,00.htm1#ixzzlg0144UvU// 
(Accessed April 12, 2012).
Lesser, I. et al. 1999. Countering the New Terrorism. Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.
Meredith, M. 2005. The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years. Free Press, London.
Morgan, M. 2004. The origins of the new terrorism. Parameters, 34(1): 29–43.
Mustapha, A.R. 2012. Boko Haram: Killing in God’s name. Mail and Guardian. April 5. 
Online. http://mg.co.za/article/2012-04-05-boko-haram-killing-in-gods-name (Accessed 
April 22, 2013).
Nigeria, National Bureau Statistics (NBS), 2010. Nigeria Poverty Profile, 2010. Online. http://
www.tucrivers.org/tucpublication/NigeriaPovertyProfile2010.pdf (Accessed June 18, 2012).
Nigeria, National Population Commission 2009. Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey 
2008. Abuja, Nigeria.
Ndujihe, C. 2013. Nigeria: Timeline of Boko Haram clashes with the state. Vanguard, April 5. 
Online. http://allafrica.com/stories/201304050505.html (Accessed April 8, 2013).
Ojie, A.E. & C. Ewhrudjakpor 2009. Ethnic diversity and public policies in Nigeria. Anthro-
pologist, 11(1): 7–14.
Okpanachi, O. 2009. Building Peace in a Divided Society: The Role of Civil Society in 
Muslim-Christian Relations in Nigeria. Paper presented at SHUR International Conference 
on “Human Rights in Conflict: The Role of Civil Society,” June 4–6, 2009. Luiss University, 
Rome.
83No Retreat, No Surrender: Understanding the Religious Terrorism of Boko Haram
Omeje, K. 2004. The state, conflict and evolving politics in the Niger Delta. Review of African 
Political Economy, 31(101): 425–440.
Onu, E. & M. Muhammad 2011. Nigeria Bank raids reach 100 this year on Boko Haram attacks. 
Bloomberg News. December 10. Online. http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-12-
10/nigeria-bank-raids-reach-100-this-year-on-boko-haram-attacks.html (Accessed Octo-
ber 3, 2012).
Onuoha, F.C. 2012. Boko Haram: Nigeria’s extremist Islamic sect. Al Jazeera Centre for Stud-
ies, February 29, pp. 1–6. Online. http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Doc
uments/2012/2/29/2012229113341793734BOKO%20HARAM%20NIGERIAS%20EX-
TREMIST%20ISLAMIC%20SECT.pdf (Accessed June 26, 2012).
Osaghae, E.E. & R.T. Suberu 2005. A History of Identities, Violence and Stability in Nigeria. 
Centre for Research and Inequality Human Security and Ethnicity, Working Paper, no. 6. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Ostien, P. 2009. Jonah Jang and the Jasawa: Ethno-Religious conflict in Jos, Nigeria. Muslim-
Christian Relations in Africa, August. Online. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1456372 (Accessed June 22, 2012).
Radin, C.J. 2012. The Threat of Boko Haram for Nigeria, Africa, and Beyond. The Long War 
Journal, April 23.
Ranstorp, M. 1996. Terrorism in the name of religion. Journal of International Affairs, 50(1): 
41–62.
Rapoport, D. 1984. Fear and trembling: Terrorism in three religious traditions. American 
Political Science Review, 78(3): 658–677.
Rogers, P. 2012. Nigeria: The generic context of the Boko Haram violence. Monthly Global 
Security Briefing, Oxford Research Group, April 30.
Roggio, B. 2012. US adds 3 Boko Haram leaders to List of Global Terrorists. The Long War 
Journal, June 21.
Seul, J.R. 1999. Ours is the way of God: Religion, identity and intergroup conflict. Journal of 
Peace Research, 36(5): 553–569.
Solomon, H. 2012. Counter-terrorism in Nigeria: Responding to Boko Haram. The RUSI 
Journal, 157(4): 6–11.
Stern, J. 2003. Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill. Harper Collins, New York.
Thurston, A. 2011. Threat of Militancy in Nigeria. Commentary for Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, September 1, 2011. Online. http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/01/
threat-of-militancy-in-nigeria/4yk8 (Accessed June 12, 2012).
Udoidem, S. 1997. Religion in the political life of Nigeria: A survey of religious-related crises 
in Nigeria since independence. In (F.U. Okafor, ed.) New Strategies for Curbing Ethnic 
and Religious Conflicts in Nigeria, pp. 152–183. Fourth Dimension, Enugu.
Umar, S. 2011. The Discourses of Salafi Radicalism and Salafi Counter-Radicalism in Nigeria: 
A Case-Study of Boko Haram. Northwestern University, Evanston, IL.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2009. Human Development Report Nigeria, 
2008–2009. UNDP, Abuja.
US Department of State 2012. Terrorist Designations of Boko Haram Commander Abubakar 
Shekau, Khalid al-Barnawi, and Abubakar Adam Kambar. US Department of State. 
Online. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/06/193574.htm (Accessed April 20, 2013).
United States Institute of Peace (USIP) 2012. What Is Boko Haram? Special Report 308. USIP, 
Washington, DC.
Uzodike, U.O. & B. Maiangwa 2012. Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria: Causal factors and 
central problematic. Africa Renaissance: Terrorism in Africa, 9(1): 91–118.
Zimmerman, K. 2011. From Somalia to Nigeria: Jihad. Online. http://www.weeklystandard.
com/blogs/somalia-nigeria-jihad_574838.html (Accessed June 18, 2012).
84 D.E. AGBIBOA
Newspaper Articles
Atlanta Blackstar, 23 April 2013. After rejecting Nigeria’s amnesty offer: Boko Haram continues 
to kill. Nick Chilles. Online. http://atlantablackstar.com/2013/04/23/after-rejecting-nigerias-
amnesty-offer-boko-haram-continues-to-kill/ (Accessed April 24, 2013).
BBC News, 11 November 2005. What the world thinks of God. Online. http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/programmes/wtwtgod/ (Accessed May 21, 2013).
— 31 July 2009. Nigeria’s “Taliban” enigma. Online. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/8172270.stm (Accessed April 20, 2013).
— 15 May 2013. Nigeria: Goodluck Jonathan declares emergency in states. Online. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22533974 (Accessed May 21, 2013).
Codewit World News, 25 March 2013. Nigeria: Grant Boko Haram amnesty or risk another 
civil war. Online. http://www.codewit.com/boko-haram/6555-nigeria-grant-boko-haram-
amnesty-or-risk-another-civil-war-nuhu-ribadu (Accessed April 23, 2013).
Daily Trust, 27 July 2009. Nigeria: Boko Haram sect leader Ustaz Mohammed vows revenge. 
Online. http://www.nairaland.com/302352/islamists-yar-adua-want-total/6 (Accessed 
April 23, 2013).
Human Rights Watch, 17 May 2011. Nigeria: Post-Election violence killed 800. Online. http://www.
hrw.org/news/2011/05/16/nigeria-post-election-violence-killed-800 (Accessed April 24, 2013).
IRIN, 22 February 2013. Nigeria: Timeline of Boko Haram and related violence. Online. http://
allafrica.com/stories/201302221321.html?page=2 (Accessed March 13, 2013).
Nigerian Tribune, 6 August 2012. Embrace Islam or resign, Boko Haram tells Jonathan. Your 
demand laughable—President. Online. http://tribune.com.ng/index.php/front-page-news/45356-
embrace-islam-or-resign-boko-haram-tells-jonathan-your-demand-laughable-president 
(Accessed April 22, 2013).
Premium Times, 22 April 2013. 185 killed in Borno town, Baga, as soliders, Boko Haram fight. 
Online. http://premiumtimesng.com/news/130680-185-killed-in-borno-town-baga-as-
soldiers-boko-haram-fight.html (Accessed April 24, 2013).
Reuters, 29 August 2011. Islamist sect Boko Haram claims U.N. bombing. Online. http://www.
reuters.com/article/2011/08/29/us-nigeria-bombing-claim-idUSTRE77S3ZO20110829 
(Accessed April 24, 2013).
The Atlantic, 24 June 2011. Nigeria’s challenge. Online. http://www.theatlantic.com/interna-
tional/archive/2011/06/nigerias-challenge/240961/ (Accessed April 23, 2013).
The Post Express (Lagos), 15 July 2000. Nigeria: Sharia, so far. Online. http://allafrica.com/
stories/200007170038.html (Accessed May 24, 2013).
The Weekly Standard, 18 June 2011. From Somalia to Nigeria: Jihad. Online. www.week-
lystandard.com/blogs/somalia-nigeria-jihad_574838.html (Accessed June 22, 2012).
— Accepted April 26, 2013
Author’s Name and Address: Daniel Egiegba Agbiboa, Oxford Department of International 
Development, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford, St. Antony’s College, 62 
Woodstock Rd, Oxford OX2 6JF, UNITED KINGDOM.
E-mail: danielagbiboa [at] gmail.com
